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Fixed

Jail chroot escape via fd exchange with a different jail

FreeBSD-SA-26:04.jail · CVE-2025-15576

Our decision for FreeSense

FreeBSD corrected this on 2025-07-29, before the FreeBSD source pin of every FreeSense version.

  • Advisory: corrected 2025-07-29
  • FreeSense 1.0 pin: e004ff15f87e (2026-08-03)
  • FreeSense 1.1 pin: a52c50b4b7c2 (2026-10-04)
  • FreeSense 1.2 pin: a52c50b4b7c2 (2026-10-04)
Decided by rules, not yet reviewed. The status comes from the advisory's correction date and the build configuration. A maintainer has not looked at whether FreeSense is exposed in practice. How we triage

By FreeSense version

VersionStatusFreeBSD pin
FreeSense 1.01.0.7 · frozen, no further fixesFixedFreeBSD pin of 2026-08-032026-08-03e004ff15
FreeSense 1.11.1.9FixedFreeBSD pin of 2026-10-042026-10-04a52c50b4
FreeSense 1.21.2.0-DEVELOPMENTFixedFreeBSD pin of 2026-10-042026-10-04a52c50b4

Workaround

No workaround is available. Note that in order to exploit this problem, an attacker requires control over processes in two jails which share a nullfs mount in which a unix socket can be installed.

What FreeBSD says

If two sibling jails are restricted to separate filesystem trees, which is to say that neither of the two jail root directories is an ancestor of the other, jailed processes may nonetheless be able to access a shared directory via a nullfs mount, if the administrator has configured one. In this case, cooperating processes in the two jails may establish a connection using a unix domain socket and exchange directory descriptors with each other. When performing a filesystem name lookup, at each step of the lookup, the kernel checks whether the lookup would descend below the jail root of the current process. If the jail root directory is not encountered, the lookup continues.

Impact

In a configuration where processes in two different jails are able to exchange file descriptors using a unix domain socket, it is possible for a jailed process to receive a directory for a descriptor that is below that process' jail root. This enables full filesystem access for a jailed process, breaking the chroot. Note that the system administrator is still responsible for ensuring that an unprivileged user on the jail host is not able to pass directory descriptors to a jailed process, even in a patched kernel.

Excerpt from the FreeBSD advisory. Read the original for the full text and the fix.

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